The Decision-Making Hierarchy in Iran Currently Looks Like This:
Mojtaba Khamenei (Supreme Leader). Formally, this is the primary center of power: he stands above the president, the armed forces, and key decisions regarding war, negotiations, and strategic course.
Head of the IRGC Ahmad Vahidi and the top brass of the security bloc.
Esmail Qaani and the Quds Force.
The Supreme National Security Council and security coordinators.
President Masoud Pezeshkian (below the security core). He is important as a public political facade, for internal management, and as part of the diplomatic track, but he is not the final authority on matters of war.
In short, the real power formula today is: Mojtaba Khamenei at the top, but his power relies on the IRGC; therefore, final decisions are made by the "Supreme Leader + IRGC security bloc" alliance, rather than by the president or diplomats.
Vahidi is the man who created the "Quds" force in 1988, when Iran lay in ruins after the war with Iraq. He saw that the regime survived then and will survive now. His psychological matrix is "survival through intransigence." Any concession is perceived not as a compromise, but as a signal of weakness that will accelerate the next strike.
Mojtaba: His mother and wife were killed in the same strike that killed his father. He came to power through a narrative of martyrdom.
Zolghadr: The eldest of them all, born in 1954, a founder of the IRGC from day one. For him, the Islamic Republic is literally his life's work. Any agreement that dismantles elements of the regime would be a personal betrayal.
Qaani (if still active): The ghost of Soleimani. His mission lies in the proxy networks. Любой мир (Any peace) that does not include the preservation of these networks is unacceptable to him.
Iran physically cannot afford for the war to resume right now. Iran likely does not want to resume hostilities: the ceasefire gives it time to regroup.
This is the key contradiction, and it explains why the ceasefire will almost certainly be extended. Iran wants time. The US wants a deal. Extension is the only option that gives both sides at least something.
Why a Fast, Comprehensive Deal Will Not Happen
Several reasons, each sufficient on its own:
Reason One: The psychology of the new leadership.
Mojtaba came to power through a narrative of martyrdom. His mother, wife, and family were killed in the same strike that killed his father. His only source of legitimacy is steadfastness and the IRGC. Quickly signing an agreement with those who killed his family would mean committing political suicide domestically. He almost certainly needs more than one round and more than one week—a series of stages—to sell any compromise as a result of resilience rather than weakness.
Reason Two: Structural deadlock on the nuclear issue.
Trump flatly stated: "There will be no uranium enrichment, and the US will dig up and remove all deeply buried nuclear material." For Vahidi and Zolghadr, this is unacceptable under any circumstances: nuclear potential is their only insurance against the "Libyan scenario." This abyss cannot be closed in weeks. It is closed either through a compromise at a level "below nuclear weapons but above zero," or it isn't closed at all.
Reason Three: Lebanon.
Iran demanded that any ceasefire extend to Lebanon; the US and Israel refused. For Qaani and the "Axis of Resistance," abandoning Hezbollah means betraying the entire proxy system they have built over 40 years.
Reason Four: Netanyahu as a permanent disruptor of negotiations.
Literally a day before the airstrikes on Iran began, Netanyahu—facing charges of bribery and fraud—narrowly survived a Knesset vote that could have toppled his government. The war offered him something more than military momentum: it gave him a temporary reprieve. The criminal trial against Netanyahu was set to resume after the conclusion of a ceasefire with Iran. He personally asked the court to postpone his own testimony. The fraud, bribery, and breach of trust trial has been ongoing since 2020 with numerous interruptions, each time linked to Israeli military actions. The mechanism is simple: as long as the war continues, the trial is suspended. Peace means the resumption of the trial. Peace means political vulnerability. War is immunity.
The Israel Conclusion:
Netanyahu has disrupted negotiations nine times in sixteen years using three tools: kinetic strikes on infrastructure, assassinations at moments of diplomatic breakthroughs, and political pressure on Washington. Each time, it happened at the moment of maximum proximity to a deal. This is not coincidence or paranoia. It is the operational pattern of a man for whom peace with Iran means the end of his political career, the resumption of his criminal trial, and the disappearance of the only narrative that has kept him in power for thirty years. The Netanyahu factor could extend the deal's timeline by 1 to 3 months beyond what is possible and increases the likelihood of collapsing already reached agreements. History shows: every time Iran and the US approached a deal over the last 12 years, Israeli action moved the finish line. This is not conspiracy—it is a documented operational pattern with predictable logic. Now, for the first time in history, Netanyahu and Trump have diverging interests on the Iranian issue. Trump wants a deal: it is his political achievement, his "deal." Netanyahu wants war until regime change or, at the very least, wants to sabotage any agreement.
Reason Five: The Strait of Hormuz. The passed law on transit fees as a new sovereign lever.
On March 30–31, 2026, Iran legislatively anchored the "Strait of Hormuz Management Plan," formalizing a system that had de facto been in operation since mid-March. The IRGC levies up to $2 million for the passage of each tanker, accepting payment in Yuan via Kunlun Bank (bypassing SWIFT), Bitcoin, and USDT. The tariff schedule is five-tiered based on the vessel's nationality: "friendly" countries pay less, while vessels linked to the US or Israel are not permitted at all. Potential revenue for the system reaches $600 to $800 million per month.
The US demands the full opening of the strait without any fees. Iran has included the right to charge fees in its 10 negotiating points as a source of funding for the country's reconstruction. The head of the IMF stated this contradicts UNCLOS. Iran considers it a sovereign right.
The political pressure is precisely calibrated. Iran is betting that Trump will lack the political tolerance for high oil prices and an inflation spike in a midterm election year. A blockade could take months to bring Iran to its knees. Time is a luxury that Republican candidates do not have.
Breaking Point: Mid-May
Analysts are already warning: maintaining the war and keeping the strait closed after mid-May will be impossible for the global economy.
But "impossible for the global economy" does not mean "impossible for Iran." It means: pressure on Trump will reach such a peak that he will either go for a deal or opt for an escalation that will hit the markets even harder.
Without stopping production, Iran can last 8 weeks in the absence of exports—until June—and its financial cushion can withstand several months of blockades.
Iran is in a situation that game theory calls "who blinks first." And it has a concrete calculation of who will blink. Their equation looks like this:
Own pain from delay: manageable until June (8 weeks without production cuts, longer with China).
Trump's pain from delay: grows exponentially (midterm elections) plus pressure from friendly nations.
As long as Trump's pain grows faster than Iran's, every day of delay works for Iran. In both cases, the window of real pressure is not earlier than the second half of May. This is the month when a deal is most likely—provided Israel does not engage in all-out sabotage. Not because both sides want peace, but because both are running out of time, just for different reasons. Trump is hitting the midterm elections. Iran is hitting its storage capacity limits.
Physical Deficits and Oil Forecasts
J.P. Morgan, in the report "JP Morgan Sees $150 Oil if Hormuz Remains Closed Through Mid-May," forecasts $120 to $130 per barrel in the base scenario and above $150 in the risk scenario if the closure persists until mid-May.
Macquarie Group, in the review "Brace for $200 Oil If War Lasts Until June," warns of prices up to $200 if the Hormuz closure lasts until June.
EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration), in the Short-Term Energy Outlook (April 2026), estimates the second-quarter peak, including May, at $115 with a partial closure; with a full closure in May, it would be significantly higher.
Brief consensus for May 2026 under full or near-full closure of Hormuz:
Most banks and agencies converge on a range of $110 to $150+ per barrel for Brent. An extreme scenario (without a breakthrough in negotiations) is $170 to $200. May is recognized by all analysts as the critical month: that is when the physical deficit will become most acute.
Current oil futures price: 95. Spot price: 131.
Three Price Movement Scenarios until April 30 (Futures Closing)
(The review above should help determine which scenario is more likely).
Option 1: A deal or extension of the ceasefire by April 21. Spot falls toward the futures price. Convergence from above. Expires around $100 - $105. No squeeze.
Option 2: The ceasefire expires, but negotiations continue. Market remains in uncertainty. Futures crawl upward from $105 to $115. Spot decreases slightly.
Option 3: The ceasefire has collapsed, no strikes, no negotiations. Physical deficit dominates. Shorts are forced to close. Futures rapidly head toward $120 during the last 5 trading days from April 24 to 30. This is the scenario J.P. Morgan calls the $120 to $130 base case if Hormuz remains closed until mid-May, but given the April 30 expiration, it realizes by the end of April.
Mojtaba Khamenei (Supreme Leader). Formally, this is the primary center of power: he stands above the president, the armed forces, and key decisions regarding war, negotiations, and strategic course.
Head of the IRGC Ahmad Vahidi and the top brass of the security bloc.
Esmail Qaani and the Quds Force.
The Supreme National Security Council and security coordinators.
President Masoud Pezeshkian (below the security core). He is important as a public political facade, for internal management, and as part of the diplomatic track, but he is not the final authority on matters of war.
In short, the real power formula today is: Mojtaba Khamenei at the top, but his power relies on the IRGC; therefore, final decisions are made by the "Supreme Leader + IRGC security bloc" alliance, rather than by the president or diplomats.
Vahidi is the man who created the "Quds" force in 1988, when Iran lay in ruins after the war with Iraq. He saw that the regime survived then and will survive now. His psychological matrix is "survival through intransigence." Any concession is perceived not as a compromise, but as a signal of weakness that will accelerate the next strike.
Mojtaba: His mother and wife were killed in the same strike that killed his father. He came to power through a narrative of martyrdom.
Zolghadr: The eldest of them all, born in 1954, a founder of the IRGC from day one. For him, the Islamic Republic is literally his life's work. Any agreement that dismantles elements of the regime would be a personal betrayal.
Qaani (if still active): The ghost of Soleimani. His mission lies in the proxy networks. Любой мир (Any peace) that does not include the preservation of these networks is unacceptable to him.
Iran physically cannot afford for the war to resume right now. Iran likely does not want to resume hostilities: the ceasefire gives it time to regroup.
This is the key contradiction, and it explains why the ceasefire will almost certainly be extended. Iran wants time. The US wants a deal. Extension is the only option that gives both sides at least something.
Why a Fast, Comprehensive Deal Will Not Happen
Several reasons, each sufficient on its own:
Reason One: The psychology of the new leadership.
Mojtaba came to power through a narrative of martyrdom. His mother, wife, and family were killed in the same strike that killed his father. His only source of legitimacy is steadfastness and the IRGC. Quickly signing an agreement with those who killed his family would mean committing political suicide domestically. He almost certainly needs more than one round and more than one week—a series of stages—to sell any compromise as a result of resilience rather than weakness.
Reason Two: Structural deadlock on the nuclear issue.
Trump flatly stated: "There will be no uranium enrichment, and the US will dig up and remove all deeply buried nuclear material." For Vahidi and Zolghadr, this is unacceptable under any circumstances: nuclear potential is their only insurance against the "Libyan scenario." This abyss cannot be closed in weeks. It is closed either through a compromise at a level "below nuclear weapons but above zero," or it isn't closed at all.
Reason Three: Lebanon.
Iran demanded that any ceasefire extend to Lebanon; the US and Israel refused. For Qaani and the "Axis of Resistance," abandoning Hezbollah means betraying the entire proxy system they have built over 40 years.
Reason Four: Netanyahu as a permanent disruptor of negotiations.
Literally a day before the airstrikes on Iran began, Netanyahu—facing charges of bribery and fraud—narrowly survived a Knesset vote that could have toppled his government. The war offered him something more than military momentum: it gave him a temporary reprieve. The criminal trial against Netanyahu was set to resume after the conclusion of a ceasefire with Iran. He personally asked the court to postpone his own testimony. The fraud, bribery, and breach of trust trial has been ongoing since 2020 with numerous interruptions, each time linked to Israeli military actions. The mechanism is simple: as long as the war continues, the trial is suspended. Peace means the resumption of the trial. Peace means political vulnerability. War is immunity.
The Israel Conclusion:
Netanyahu has disrupted negotiations nine times in sixteen years using three tools: kinetic strikes on infrastructure, assassinations at moments of diplomatic breakthroughs, and political pressure on Washington. Each time, it happened at the moment of maximum proximity to a deal. This is not coincidence or paranoia. It is the operational pattern of a man for whom peace with Iran means the end of his political career, the resumption of his criminal trial, and the disappearance of the only narrative that has kept him in power for thirty years. The Netanyahu factor could extend the deal's timeline by 1 to 3 months beyond what is possible and increases the likelihood of collapsing already reached agreements. History shows: every time Iran and the US approached a deal over the last 12 years, Israeli action moved the finish line. This is not conspiracy—it is a documented operational pattern with predictable logic. Now, for the first time in history, Netanyahu and Trump have diverging interests on the Iranian issue. Trump wants a deal: it is his political achievement, his "deal." Netanyahu wants war until regime change or, at the very least, wants to sabotage any agreement.
Reason Five: The Strait of Hormuz. The passed law on transit fees as a new sovereign lever.
On March 30–31, 2026, Iran legislatively anchored the "Strait of Hormuz Management Plan," formalizing a system that had de facto been in operation since mid-March. The IRGC levies up to $2 million for the passage of each tanker, accepting payment in Yuan via Kunlun Bank (bypassing SWIFT), Bitcoin, and USDT. The tariff schedule is five-tiered based on the vessel's nationality: "friendly" countries pay less, while vessels linked to the US or Israel are not permitted at all. Potential revenue for the system reaches $600 to $800 million per month.
The US demands the full opening of the strait without any fees. Iran has included the right to charge fees in its 10 negotiating points as a source of funding for the country's reconstruction. The head of the IMF stated this contradicts UNCLOS. Iran considers it a sovereign right.
The political pressure is precisely calibrated. Iran is betting that Trump will lack the political tolerance for high oil prices and an inflation spike in a midterm election year. A blockade could take months to bring Iran to its knees. Time is a luxury that Republican candidates do not have.
Breaking Point: Mid-May
Analysts are already warning: maintaining the war and keeping the strait closed after mid-May will be impossible for the global economy.
But "impossible for the global economy" does not mean "impossible for Iran." It means: pressure on Trump will reach such a peak that he will either go for a deal or opt for an escalation that will hit the markets even harder.
Without stopping production, Iran can last 8 weeks in the absence of exports—until June—and its financial cushion can withstand several months of blockades.
Iran is in a situation that game theory calls "who blinks first." And it has a concrete calculation of who will blink. Their equation looks like this:
Own pain from delay: manageable until June (8 weeks without production cuts, longer with China).
Trump's pain from delay: grows exponentially (midterm elections) plus pressure from friendly nations.
As long as Trump's pain grows faster than Iran's, every day of delay works for Iran. In both cases, the window of real pressure is not earlier than the second half of May. This is the month when a deal is most likely—provided Israel does not engage in all-out sabotage. Not because both sides want peace, but because both are running out of time, just for different reasons. Trump is hitting the midterm elections. Iran is hitting its storage capacity limits.
Physical Deficits and Oil Forecasts
J.P. Morgan, in the report "JP Morgan Sees $150 Oil if Hormuz Remains Closed Through Mid-May," forecasts $120 to $130 per barrel in the base scenario and above $150 in the risk scenario if the closure persists until mid-May.
Macquarie Group, in the review "Brace for $200 Oil If War Lasts Until June," warns of prices up to $200 if the Hormuz closure lasts until June.
EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration), in the Short-Term Energy Outlook (April 2026), estimates the second-quarter peak, including May, at $115 with a partial closure; with a full closure in May, it would be significantly higher.
Brief consensus for May 2026 under full or near-full closure of Hormuz:
Most banks and agencies converge on a range of $110 to $150+ per barrel for Brent. An extreme scenario (without a breakthrough in negotiations) is $170 to $200. May is recognized by all analysts as the critical month: that is when the physical deficit will become most acute.
Current oil futures price: 95. Spot price: 131.
Three Price Movement Scenarios until April 30 (Futures Closing)
(The review above should help determine which scenario is more likely).
Option 1: A deal or extension of the ceasefire by April 21. Spot falls toward the futures price. Convergence from above. Expires around $100 - $105. No squeeze.
Option 2: The ceasefire expires, but negotiations continue. Market remains in uncertainty. Futures crawl upward from $105 to $115. Spot decreases slightly.
Option 3: The ceasefire has collapsed, no strikes, no negotiations. Physical deficit dominates. Shorts are forced to close. Futures rapidly head toward $120 during the last 5 trading days from April 24 to 30. This is the scenario J.P. Morgan calls the $120 to $130 base case if Hormuz remains closed until mid-May, but given the April 30 expiration, it realizes by the end of April.
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Disclaimer
The information and publications are not meant to be, and do not constitute, financial, investment, trading, or other types of advice or recommendations supplied or endorsed by TradingView. Read more in the Terms of Use.
Хочешь хороших денег – умей выжидать
Disclaimer
The information and publications are not meant to be, and do not constitute, financial, investment, trading, or other types of advice or recommendations supplied or endorsed by TradingView. Read more in the Terms of Use.