Good day, friends.
Today we'll analyze the USDRUB pair and try to predict where the ruble is heading.
Obviously, the exchange rate is currently under manual control, but still.
Let's start with the big picture
We can observe that the price is at a key historical level — roughly the same level as before the conflict began.
The second level of interest lies in key accumulation zones. In this zone, we can expect potential consolidation if the regulator continues pumping the market with foreign currency.
Now, let's zoom in — the price is being pushed toward a key level.
Why is that?
Let's look at the news. The main points:
CMASF (Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-term Forecasting) — an analytical center close to the Russian government — warns of a high probability of a banking crisis in the second half of 2026 and a possible recession by October 2026 (due to loan servicing problems among households and businesses, as well as rising delinquencies).
NWF (National Wealth Fund)
The Fund is injecting one trillion rubles into state banks following warnings about an impending banking crisis.
Information about NWF injections into state banks fully corresponds to official data from Russia's Ministry of Finance, published on January 20, 2026.
NWF Injections into State Banks:
• VEB.RF — 1,319.0 billion RUB (deposits and subordinated deposits)
• VTB — 293.2 billion RUB (subordinated deposits)
• Gazprombank — 204.1 billion RUB (subordinated deposits)
• Sberbank — 94.2 billion RUB (subordinated deposit)
• Sovcombank — 29.6 billion RUB (subordinated deposit)
Earlier, Bloomberg reported that executives of Russia's largest banks discussed the possibility of seeking government support due to rising bad loans.
But the devil is in the details, and the name of that detail is — the Central Bank's Fiscal Rule.
What It Is and How It Works
The CBR Fiscal Rule is a mechanism that directly links government spending (including from the NWF) to the exchange rate through automatic liquidity sterilization.
Simplified scheme:
When the Ministry of Finance spends NWF money to support banks, it pumps rubles into the economy.
This creates excess liquidity, which can cause inflation and weaken the ruble.
The Central Bank sells foreign currency from its reserves on the domestic market to absorb excess rubles and ease pressure on the exchange rate.
Simultaneously, the CBR could raise interest rates (making credit more expensive) to sterilize excess liquidity.
💥 Why the Fiscal Rule Is Currently Working Against the Ruble
Problem #1: Depletion of Foreign Currency Reserves
In January 2026, the CBR sharply increased currency sales — by 17.42 billion rubles daily. This is twice as much as at the end of 2025.
The paradox: The more the NWF spends on bank support, the faster the CBR is forced to dump currency to prevent inflation. But currency reserves are finite — according to the data above, the liquid portion of the NWF has shrunk to 4.08 trillion rubles (~1.9% of GDP).
Problem #2: The Cost of Money Trap
• CBR sells currency → USD supply increases → Weakens ruble ↓ • CBR raises rates → Attracts investment → Strengthens ruble ↑ • MinFin spends NWF → Pumps rubles into economy → Weakens ruble ↓
Problem #3: Loss of Rate Maneuverability
Currently, the CBR is in a contradictory position: • Upward pressure on rates: NWF spending generates excess rubles and inflationary pressure, requiring higher rates. • Downward pressure on rates: Banks are in crisis and need lower rates for debt servicing.
Expected trajectory: The CBR plans to reduce the average key rate from the current ~19% to 13% in 2026.
When rates start to decline, this will directly undermine the attractiveness of ruble-denominated assets for foreign investors, creating additional pressure on the currency.
Current Situation (January 2026)
The Ministry of Finance is actively increasing currency sales under the fiscal rule:
• In January–early February, the volume of gold and currency sales will increase.
• This has led to temporary ruble strengthening below 78 RUB/USD.
• However, this is a short-term effect.
🎯 Conclusions on the Fiscal Rule's Impact on USD/RUB
Final assessment: The fiscal rule in this context is not a panacea but a delaying mechanism. It buys time but simultaneously accumulates risks through NWF depletion. If the banking crisis hits (H2 2026) and even larger injections are needed, the system could quickly collapse, causing sharp ruble depreciation.
📊 Current NWF Liquidity Level (as of January 1, 2026)
NWF liquid assets totaled:
• 4.085 trillion rubles or 52.2 billion USD
• This is ~1.9% of GDP (for comparison: at the beginning of 2024, it was ~7% of GDP)
NWF Structure (end of December 2025):
• Total volume: 13.42 trillion rubles (6.2% of GDP)
• Liquid portion: 4.08 trillion rubles (30% of total)
• Illiquid portion: 9.34 trillion rubles (stocks, gold, real estate)
Depletion Rate: Critically High
Over one year (2025), the liquid portion decreased by approximately 1.5–2 trillion rubles due to:
Injections into state banks: 1.02 trillion rubles
Budget deficit financing: unofficially another ~0.5–0.7 trillion rubles
Currency revaluation losses: foreign currency depreciates when the ruble weakens
The currency position is particularly vulnerable: • Chinese yuan reserves fell to 209.15 billion yuan — the lowest since the fund's creation. • This indicates maximum currency sales to support the ruble exchange rate.
🚨 Budget Pressure in 2026
Planned budget deficit: 3.8 trillion rubles
Officially approved by the State Duma:
• Revenue: 40.3 trillion rubles
• Expenditure: 44 trillion rubles
• Deficit: 3.8 trillion rubles (1.8% of GDP)
• From NWF: only 38.5 billion rubles (officially)
The NWF was created as a buffer for rainy days, but it is currently being spent to maintain the current economy. This means there is no safety cushion, and the first serious shock (banking crisis, oil price collapse, new sanctions) will lead to an uncontrolled crisis in late 2026 – early 2027.
Some may beat their chest and claim that sanctions don't work, but...
The treasury is running dry, milord.
⏰ Depletion Forecast: 3 Scenarios (assuming current sanctions persist)
Scenario 1: BASELINE (1.5–2 trillion RUB/year spending from NWF)
At the 2025 pace:
• Jan 1, 2026 — 4.08 trillion RUB — Current state
• Jan 1, 2027 — 2.0–2.5 trillion RUB — Critical level
• Jan 1, 2028 — 0.5–1.0 trillion RUB — Rock bottom
Scenario 2: ACCELERATED (2.5–3 trillion RUB/year spending)
This scenario develops if:
• The banking crisis starts earlier (Q2 2026 instead of H2 2026)
• Bank injections increase from 1.02 trillion to 2+ trillion rubles per year
• The budget deficit expands (due to military operations, sanctions, revenue decline)
Timeline:
• Jan 1, 2026 — 4.08 trillion RUB
• Jul 1, 2026 — 2.5–2.8 trillion RUB — Crisis begins
• Jan 1, 2027 — 1.5–1.8 trillion RUB — Panic begins
• Jul 1, 2027 — ~0 trillion RUB
Scenario 3: OPTIMISTIC (replenishment from oil & gas revenues)
Conditions:
• Brent oil price stable at 70–72 USD/barrel
• IMF forecasts 62.13 USD/barrel average for 2026
• Current prices: 66–70 USD/barrel
Calculation:
If oil holds at 70 USD/barrel, annual oil & gas revenues will be ~10–10.5 trillion rubles. With planned NWF spending of 38.5 billion rubles (per the official 2026 budget), the fund:
• Will be replenished by approximately 1–2 trillion RUB per year
• Depletion will be postponed by 5–7 years
(However, news about the seizure of the shadow fleet doesn't add much optimism here.)
📈 Key Monitoring Checkpoints
• Jan 1, 2026 — 4.08 trillion — Current state
• Apr 1, 2026 — 3.2–3.5 trillion — Q1: budget & bank support
• Jul 1, 2026 — 2.5–2.8 trillion — Possible crisis onset
• Oct 1, 2026 — 1.8–2.2 trillion — Panic begins (new injections)
💥 What Happens When the NWF Is Depleted
Short-term effect (1–3 months before depletion):
Markets will panic:
• Speculation on ruble weakening → massive capital outflow
• Accelerating inflation → CBR forced to raise rates despite the crisis
• Chaos in the currency market — CBR may introduce exchange controls
Scenarios (from most to least likely):
Introduction of currency controls
Sharp ruble depreciation (110–130 RUB/USD)
Depositor panic, bank runs
Bank defaults (payment failures)
Devaluation, restructuring
Related Conclusion
To negotiate sanctions relief in the context of a Russia-Ukraine ceasefire, there are approximately 3 years left.
Otherwise, things will get very tough.
To cover the budget deficit, our government officials, out of love for the people and economic necessity, will invent even more taxes and fees. The one-party system will easily pass any law.
Raising the retirement age, pension points, VAT increases — these are just flowers.
📉 Forecast Thoughts
If the CBR continues currency sales — ruble strengthening to 73 RUB.
A spike down to 72 is possible.
Keep in mind that they need to push the rate to a level where there's enough buffer when rates are cut.
Consolidation is possible amid Q1 injections, followed by expected growth.
First growth target: 80.70
Second target: 87–90
Possible scenario breaker: Progress in negotiations.
On positive news with official confirmation, the ruble could strengthen sharply (which isn't great for business, but that's another story).
What do you think?
With Respect to Everyone, Your #SinnSeed
Today we'll analyze the USDRUB pair and try to predict where the ruble is heading.
Obviously, the exchange rate is currently under manual control, but still.
Let's start with the big picture
We can observe that the price is at a key historical level — roughly the same level as before the conflict began.
The second level of interest lies in key accumulation zones. In this zone, we can expect potential consolidation if the regulator continues pumping the market with foreign currency.
Now, let's zoom in — the price is being pushed toward a key level.
Why is that?
Let's look at the news. The main points:
CMASF (Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-term Forecasting) — an analytical center close to the Russian government — warns of a high probability of a banking crisis in the second half of 2026 and a possible recession by October 2026 (due to loan servicing problems among households and businesses, as well as rising delinquencies).
NWF (National Wealth Fund)
The Fund is injecting one trillion rubles into state banks following warnings about an impending banking crisis.
Information about NWF injections into state banks fully corresponds to official data from Russia's Ministry of Finance, published on January 20, 2026.
NWF Injections into State Banks:
• VEB.RF — 1,319.0 billion RUB (deposits and subordinated deposits)
• VTB — 293.2 billion RUB (subordinated deposits)
• Gazprombank — 204.1 billion RUB (subordinated deposits)
• Sberbank — 94.2 billion RUB (subordinated deposit)
• Sovcombank — 29.6 billion RUB (subordinated deposit)
Earlier, Bloomberg reported that executives of Russia's largest banks discussed the possibility of seeking government support due to rising bad loans.
But the devil is in the details, and the name of that detail is — the Central Bank's Fiscal Rule.
What It Is and How It Works
The CBR Fiscal Rule is a mechanism that directly links government spending (including from the NWF) to the exchange rate through automatic liquidity sterilization.
Simplified scheme:
When the Ministry of Finance spends NWF money to support banks, it pumps rubles into the economy.
This creates excess liquidity, which can cause inflation and weaken the ruble.
The Central Bank sells foreign currency from its reserves on the domestic market to absorb excess rubles and ease pressure on the exchange rate.
Simultaneously, the CBR could raise interest rates (making credit more expensive) to sterilize excess liquidity.
💥 Why the Fiscal Rule Is Currently Working Against the Ruble
Problem #1: Depletion of Foreign Currency Reserves
In January 2026, the CBR sharply increased currency sales — by 17.42 billion rubles daily. This is twice as much as at the end of 2025.
The paradox: The more the NWF spends on bank support, the faster the CBR is forced to dump currency to prevent inflation. But currency reserves are finite — according to the data above, the liquid portion of the NWF has shrunk to 4.08 trillion rubles (~1.9% of GDP).
Problem #2: The Cost of Money Trap
• CBR sells currency → USD supply increases → Weakens ruble ↓ • CBR raises rates → Attracts investment → Strengthens ruble ↑ • MinFin spends NWF → Pumps rubles into economy → Weakens ruble ↓
Problem #3: Loss of Rate Maneuverability
Currently, the CBR is in a contradictory position: • Upward pressure on rates: NWF spending generates excess rubles and inflationary pressure, requiring higher rates. • Downward pressure on rates: Banks are in crisis and need lower rates for debt servicing.
Expected trajectory: The CBR plans to reduce the average key rate from the current ~19% to 13% in 2026.
When rates start to decline, this will directly undermine the attractiveness of ruble-denominated assets for foreign investors, creating additional pressure on the currency.
Current Situation (January 2026)
The Ministry of Finance is actively increasing currency sales under the fiscal rule:
• In January–early February, the volume of gold and currency sales will increase.
• This has led to temporary ruble strengthening below 78 RUB/USD.
• However, this is a short-term effect.
🎯 Conclusions on the Fiscal Rule's Impact on USD/RUB
Final assessment: The fiscal rule in this context is not a panacea but a delaying mechanism. It buys time but simultaneously accumulates risks through NWF depletion. If the banking crisis hits (H2 2026) and even larger injections are needed, the system could quickly collapse, causing sharp ruble depreciation.
📊 Current NWF Liquidity Level (as of January 1, 2026)
NWF liquid assets totaled:
• 4.085 trillion rubles or 52.2 billion USD
• This is ~1.9% of GDP (for comparison: at the beginning of 2024, it was ~7% of GDP)
NWF Structure (end of December 2025):
• Total volume: 13.42 trillion rubles (6.2% of GDP)
• Liquid portion: 4.08 trillion rubles (30% of total)
• Illiquid portion: 9.34 trillion rubles (stocks, gold, real estate)
Depletion Rate: Critically High
Over one year (2025), the liquid portion decreased by approximately 1.5–2 trillion rubles due to:
Injections into state banks: 1.02 trillion rubles
Budget deficit financing: unofficially another ~0.5–0.7 trillion rubles
Currency revaluation losses: foreign currency depreciates when the ruble weakens
The currency position is particularly vulnerable: • Chinese yuan reserves fell to 209.15 billion yuan — the lowest since the fund's creation. • This indicates maximum currency sales to support the ruble exchange rate.
🚨 Budget Pressure in 2026
Planned budget deficit: 3.8 trillion rubles
Officially approved by the State Duma:
• Revenue: 40.3 trillion rubles
• Expenditure: 44 trillion rubles
• Deficit: 3.8 trillion rubles (1.8% of GDP)
• From NWF: only 38.5 billion rubles (officially)
The NWF was created as a buffer for rainy days, but it is currently being spent to maintain the current economy. This means there is no safety cushion, and the first serious shock (banking crisis, oil price collapse, new sanctions) will lead to an uncontrolled crisis in late 2026 – early 2027.
Some may beat their chest and claim that sanctions don't work, but...
The treasury is running dry, milord.
⏰ Depletion Forecast: 3 Scenarios (assuming current sanctions persist)
Scenario 1: BASELINE (1.5–2 trillion RUB/year spending from NWF)
At the 2025 pace:
• Jan 1, 2026 — 4.08 trillion RUB — Current state
• Jan 1, 2027 — 2.0–2.5 trillion RUB — Critical level
• Jan 1, 2028 — 0.5–1.0 trillion RUB — Rock bottom
Scenario 2: ACCELERATED (2.5–3 trillion RUB/year spending)
This scenario develops if:
• The banking crisis starts earlier (Q2 2026 instead of H2 2026)
• Bank injections increase from 1.02 trillion to 2+ trillion rubles per year
• The budget deficit expands (due to military operations, sanctions, revenue decline)
Timeline:
• Jan 1, 2026 — 4.08 trillion RUB
• Jul 1, 2026 — 2.5–2.8 trillion RUB — Crisis begins
• Jan 1, 2027 — 1.5–1.8 trillion RUB — Panic begins
• Jul 1, 2027 — ~0 trillion RUB
Scenario 3: OPTIMISTIC (replenishment from oil & gas revenues)
Conditions:
• Brent oil price stable at 70–72 USD/barrel
• IMF forecasts 62.13 USD/barrel average for 2026
• Current prices: 66–70 USD/barrel
Calculation:
If oil holds at 70 USD/barrel, annual oil & gas revenues will be ~10–10.5 trillion rubles. With planned NWF spending of 38.5 billion rubles (per the official 2026 budget), the fund:
• Will be replenished by approximately 1–2 trillion RUB per year
• Depletion will be postponed by 5–7 years
(However, news about the seizure of the shadow fleet doesn't add much optimism here.)
📈 Key Monitoring Checkpoints
• Jan 1, 2026 — 4.08 trillion — Current state
• Apr 1, 2026 — 3.2–3.5 trillion — Q1: budget & bank support
• Jul 1, 2026 — 2.5–2.8 trillion — Possible crisis onset
• Oct 1, 2026 — 1.8–2.2 trillion — Panic begins (new injections)
💥 What Happens When the NWF Is Depleted
Short-term effect (1–3 months before depletion):
Markets will panic:
• Speculation on ruble weakening → massive capital outflow
• Accelerating inflation → CBR forced to raise rates despite the crisis
• Chaos in the currency market — CBR may introduce exchange controls
Scenarios (from most to least likely):
Introduction of currency controls
Sharp ruble depreciation (110–130 RUB/USD)
Depositor panic, bank runs
Bank defaults (payment failures)
Devaluation, restructuring
Related Conclusion
To negotiate sanctions relief in the context of a Russia-Ukraine ceasefire, there are approximately 3 years left.
Otherwise, things will get very tough.
To cover the budget deficit, our government officials, out of love for the people and economic necessity, will invent even more taxes and fees. The one-party system will easily pass any law.
Raising the retirement age, pension points, VAT increases — these are just flowers.
📉 Forecast Thoughts
If the CBR continues currency sales — ruble strengthening to 73 RUB.
A spike down to 72 is possible.
Keep in mind that they need to push the rate to a level where there's enough buffer when rates are cut.
Consolidation is possible amid Q1 injections, followed by expected growth.
First growth target: 80.70
Second target: 87–90
Possible scenario breaker: Progress in negotiations.
On positive news with official confirmation, the ruble could strengthen sharply (which isn't great for business, but that's another story).
What do you think?
With Respect to Everyone, Your #SinnSeed
Trade active
🔴 Additional forecast-related news:🛢 Ministry of Finance prepares to tighten the budget rule
The Ministry of Finance is considering an accelerated reduction of the oil price cutoff — from the current 59 USD to 45–50 USD/bbl. The decision could be made as early as March 2026.
📉 What's happening
Oil & gas revenues are dropping sharply (as we expected): global oil prices remain low, and the Urals discount is significant. The share of oil & gas revenues risks falling below 20–22% of the budget — a critical level for the current spending model.
⚙️ The mechanism
Currently, everything above the cutoff price goes into the NWF. If the threshold is lowered — fewer revenues are classified as "above-plan," which means:
→ less spending from reserves to cover the deficit → fewer foreign currency sales from the NWF → the budget formally becomes tighter
💰 Who benefits
🔹 Ministry of Finance — the budget looks more resilient, reserves deplete more slowly 🔹 Long-term OFZ holders — reduced risk of a fiscal crisis 🔹 Exporters — a weaker ruble boosts ruble-denominated revenues
⚠️ Who loses
🔸 Importers and consumers — a weaker ruble drives up prices 🔸 The Central Bank — currency pressure complicates the fight against inflation 🔸 Public sector employees and social spending — potential downward revision of expenditures
💱 Ruble under pressure
A reduction in foreign currency sales from the NWF could weaken the ruble by 5% or more in an aggressive scenario. This is the key transmission channel to the market.
🚨 Takeaway
The Ministry of Finance is choosing between two risks: rapidly depleting reserves or tightening the belt now. It appears they're choosing the latter. If the decision is made in March — expect a repricing across FX and bond markets. This could become the main macro event of spring 2026.
Disclaimer
The information and publications are not meant to be, and do not constitute, financial, investment, trading, or other types of advice or recommendations supplied or endorsed by TradingView. Read more in the Terms of Use.
Disclaimer
The information and publications are not meant to be, and do not constitute, financial, investment, trading, or other types of advice or recommendations supplied or endorsed by TradingView. Read more in the Terms of Use.